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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of financial deepening across regions in Indonesia 
after the institutional reforms which brought the country to become more decentralized. 
Using provincial-level data for 33 provinces from 2004 to 2010, we find that poor local 
governance significantly impedes financial deepening. Our results also conclude that in the 
socioeconomically less developed regions, the level of financial deepening is lower than that 
of more developed regions. Various policy implications are provided. Even though 
decentralization has been implemented, regional disparity in the form of financial deepening 
still exists. Improving local governance should be imposed to facilitate favorable business 
environment. Moreover, regulators have to reconsider regulations that have constrained bank 
lending. 
Keywords: Financial deepening, Local governance, Socioeconomic, Indonesia  
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1. Introduction 
Severe regional development disparity under the New Order regime in Indonesia 
(Akita and Alisjahbana, 2002; Aritenang, 2008) was believed to be due to strong 
centralization during such a regime
3
. Following the harmful 1997/1998 economic crisis and 
the fall of the regime, decentralization and local democratization have been implemented as a 
part of the institutional reforms (Henderson and Kuncoro, 2011). Decentralization is expected 
to reduce inequality in economic development as the local governments at the provincial and 
district/municipal levels now have more latitude in establishing cooperation with 
organizations in foreign countries which could increase the openness of the regions 
(Aritenang, 2008). To bolster economic growth, one important aspect that should be 
considered is developing the financial sector to facilitate growth (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; 
Levine, 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Roe and 
Siegel, 2011). However, even though decentralization has already been extensively 
implemented, the degree of financial deepening in Indonesia still highly varies across regions. 
Indonesian commercial banks have performed well in terms of profitability and soundness; 
however, they fail to broaden access to finance, particularly for the poor as well as micro, 
small and medium enterprises, which therefore in general Indonesia are still categorized as 
“underbanked” (Rosengard and Prasetyantoko, 2011).   
The present paper investigates the determinants of cross-region differences in 
financial deepening in Indonesia. More specifically we question whether local governance 
and socioeconomic conditions contribute to determine the level of financial deepening which 
is measured by three proxies: the ratio of loans to province’s GDP, the ratio of loans granted 
to micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs)
4
 over province’s GDP and the ratio of 
commercial bank offices per million province’s population5.  We extend the literature on the 
determinants of financial deepening by studying differences within a country instead of 
differences across countries which enables us to reduce noise and the number of controlling 
factors in our investigation. Controlling for regional characteristics, we find that poor local 
                                                            
3 The New Order (Indonesian: Orde Baru) regime under President Soeharto led Indonesia for 32 years (1966-
1998). President Soeharto stepped down in May 1998 when the chronic 1997/1998 economic crisis dragged the 
country into a social riot. 
4 Micro, small and medium enterprises are dominant business units in Indonesia. These firms represent a 
significant contribution both in urban and in rural areas. Therefore, bank lending to micro, small and medium 
enterprises is an important issue in Indonesia (Trinugroho et al., 2012).  
5 We focus on the banking development as the measure of financial deepening because the capital market and 
other financial intermediation institutions were still relatively underdeveloped and highly concentrated in some 
large cities.  
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governance is significantly and negatively associated with financial deepening. Our results 
also reveal that in the socioeconomically less developed regions, the level of financial 
deepening is significantly lower than that of more developed regions.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews previous work on 
related issues. We discuss the institutional background in Indonesia in section 3. In Section 4, 
we describe the methodology. Section 5 reports the results and robustness checks. Section 6 
concludes our findings and provides policy implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Financial deepening is generally defined as the growth in the scale of financial 
transactions related to the real economy (Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012). A growing body of 
literature has outlined factors determining cross-country differences in financial development 
particularly stressing on institutional factors. According to the seminal papers of La Porta et 
al. (1997, 1998) on law and finance, that have empirically examined (e.g. La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998, Levine, 1998, Beck et al., 2003; Gallindo and Micco, 2004; Gallindo and Micco, 
2005; Laeven and Majnoni, 2005; Djankov et al., 2007; Dehesa et al., 2007; Dietrich et al., 
2009), several country-level variables - related to legal institutions such as legal origin, credit 
rights, rule of law and quality of law enforcement - matter to explain some aspects of finance, 
for instance credit to private sector, capital market development, investor protection and cost 
of financial intermediation. La Porta et al., (1997) and Levine, (1998), in a cross country 
study, find that the breadth of the credit market is positively correlated with good law 
enforcement and protection of creditor rights. Creditor rights protection stimulates both 
lenders and borrowers to enter into financial contracts and subsequently boosts financial 
development (Galindo and Micco, 2004). Djankov et al. (2007) underline two major 
determinants of private credit as suggested by economic theory. First, the power of creditors 
which reflects how easy lenders can force repayment, take collateral or even take control of 
the firm plays an important role. Second, the quality of information is also important as 
lenders would more likely act as lenders if they are well-informed on the borrowers. Rajan 
and Zingales (2003) and Becerra et al. (2012) emphasize the impact of political factors on 
financial development. Another comprehensive explanation on the determinants of financial 
development is provided by Herger et al. (2008) highlighting three determinants of a 
country’s financial development: cultural heritage, institutional factors, and the degree of 
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openness and transparency. More recently, Roe and Siegel (2011) underline the impact of 
political stability on financial development indicating that after controlling for investor 
protection, legal origin, and trade openness, political instability can significantly impede a 
country’s financial development.    
Referring to those who work on the matter of institutional factors, first, we consider 
that the quality of local governance greatly influences the level of provincial financial depth. 
As explained by Rajan and Zingales (2003), government interventions in the financial sector 
development should be in the forms of improving property rights, promoting transparency 
and disclosure, ensuring legal system effectiveness, and facilitating regulatory infrastructure. 
Although law including its features is generally identical among regions within a country, the 
quality of its enforcement is not necessarily the same. Accordingly, the quality of local 
governance is important to ensure that legal institutions are well enforced particularly 
regarding the creditor/ lender rights. Moreover, local governance, especially with regard to 
the bureaucratic process in doing business, indicates how well the local government 
facilitates favorable business conditions. Poor governance is highly associated with 
corruption and rent seeking behaviors which are detrimental factors to business investment 
and public infrastructure development. Subsequently, commercial banks may be reluctant to 
establish their business in the poor governance regions because it is quite risky and costly.     
Another major factor that could determine the degree of financial intermediation at 
the provincial level in Indonesia is the socioeconomic conditions. The socioeconomic 
conditions represent some aspects of quality of life such as education, poverty, life 
expectancy, living standards, and unemployment. Related to financial deepening, the impact 
of socioeconomic conditions could be viewed from lender (banks) and borrower sides. From 
the lender side, as argued by Djankov et al., (2007) and Japelli and Pagano (2002) lenders 
would be more willing to deal with borrowers if they are well informed. Hence, in the 
socioeconomically less developed regions banks have less incentives to channel credits as the 
information as well as the quality of borrowers are inadequate. It is therefore more expensive 
for banks to grant loans in terms of information and dealing costs. Moreover insufficient 
quality of borrowers could increase bank credit risk.  
From the borrower side, the decision to borrow money from banks is also determined 
by socioeconomic conditions. For instance, for less educated people, the process of getting 
loans from banks may be perceived as more complicated than the process of obtaining a loan 
5 
 
from predatory lender
6
 or a pawnshop. Therefore, they tend to avoid borrowing money from 
commercial banks.    
 
3. Institutional Background 
As an archipelago and comprised of so many ethnic groups with different languages, 
religions, and traditions, it is quite difficult to manage Indonesia and to achieve equal 
economic development. The New Order regime applied the “trickle-down economics” theory 
which relied on growth as the most important element in economic development. It was 
expected that this economic system would lead to a common prosperity because the trickle-
down effect could also reach the poor. However, the implementation of this system failed. 
The chronic 1997/1998 economic crisis dragged the country into a social and political unrest 
and it generated a serious conflict of class between the poor and the rich as the gap between 
the two has widened over the years. Economic development inequality across regions was 
also pronounced during the regime.  
The Indonesia’s institutional reforms which were implemented in the latter half of 
1998 have led the country to become more democratized, decentralized, and deregulated 
(Mursitama, 2006; Henderson and Kuncoro, 2011). Referring to the Indonesian 
decentralization Law No 22/1999, the local governments now have authorities in all 
governmental functions except foreign policy, security and defense, religion, judiciary, fiscal 
and monetary policy, and some other aspects. Moreover, local governments are also 
permitted to establish cooperation with organizations in foreign countries which could 
increase their openness (Aritenang, 2008), and subsequently should accelerate the financial 
development of the regions (Herger et al., 2008). On the other hand, however, 
decentralization and local democratization lead to abuse of power as well. Many powerful 
local political figures play dominant roles in many aspects. They tend to act as “little kings” 
including providing privileges to those who seek the rents.  
                                                            
6 Predatory lending in Indonesia is a non-bank lending with high interest rate charged mostly on daily or weekly 
repayment basis. It is slightly different with the concept of payday lending that has been regulated in some states 
in the US (e.g. Stegman and Faris, 2003; Stegman, 2007; Morse, 2011). Payday lending is a source of short-term 
consumer credit in low- and moderate-income communities given to those having fixed-income (mostly salary), 
while predatory lending in the Indonesia’s case is such loans given to those with or without (mostly without) 
fixed-income. In the Indonesian language, such money lenders are usually called rentenir or tengkulak or bank 
plecit.    
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For years, broadening access to finance, particularly for the poor as well as micro, 
small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), has been a central issue in Indonesia. Even though 
this country is known as an example of the success of microfinance
7
 (Hamada, 2010), 
Indonesia is generally still “underbanked” (Rosengard and Prasetyantoko, 2011), especially 
with regard to access to finance for the poor and MSMEs. Moreover, paradoxically, this 
credit constraint is strengthened by bank regulation; for risk management purposes, bank 
borrowers' income has to exceed three times the borrowed funds. Another regulatory 
constraint to widen access to bank financing, as revealed by Rosengard and Prasetyantoko 
(2011), is the introduction of Indonesian banking architecture (Indonesian: Arsitektur 
Perbankan Indonesia/ API)
8
 stressing banking consolidation which subsequently has 
strengthened market power exacerbating the inefficiency of bank intermediation.  
 
4. Methodology 
We investigate the determinants of financial deepening across regions in Indonesia after 
the decentralization process. We use panel data for 33 provinces from 2004 to 2010.  
4.1. Variables and Data 
- Financial Depth 
As explained earlier, we have three proxies of our dependent variable (financial 
depth) which are: 
 The ratio of credit released by commercial banks located in a province to province’s GDP  
 The ratio of commercial bank loans given to micro, small and medium enterprises in a 
province over the province’s GDP  
 The ratio of number of bank branches per million population of the province 
Data on bank loans, bank loans to MSMEs and commercial bank offices at the 
provincial level are collected from Bank Indonesia (Central bank of Indonesia), while data on 
                                                            
7 Hamada (2010) exemplifies BRI (Indonesian: Bank Rakyat Indonesia), the third largest Indonesian state-
owned bank, as the one of the world’s most successful commercialization of microfinance as it is 
supported by nationwide network of microfinance local units enabling this bank to release large quantity 
of loans.  
8 The Indonesian Banking Architecture, a road map of the Indonesian banking sector which would be 
implemented gradually, was introduced by the Indonesian government in 2004 (Trinugroho et al., 2012). 
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provinces’ GDP and provinces' population come from the Indonesia Statistics Bureau 
(Indonesian: Biro Pusat Statistik/ BPS). 
- Local Governance 
To measure local governance, we rely on the local governance index released by the 
Partnership (Indonesian: Kemitraan), a multi-stakeholder organization which is assigned to 
promote and institutionalize good governance principles in Indonesian society by 
implementing harmonized reform programs to strengthen public service governance, deepen 
democracy, improve security and justice and improve economic and environmental 
governance. This index defines governance as the process of formulation and implementation 
of rules and regulation through interaction between state, civil society, and economic society. 
Therefore, it consists of four sub-indexes which are bureaucracy index, government index, 
civil society index, and economic society index. However, as the focus of local governance in 
this paper is to assess the government roles in promoting financial development, we only take 
the bureaucracy index and government index as the proxies of local governance. The 
bureaucracy index reflects the governance of public service, local revenue collection and the 
regulation of the local economy, while the government index measures the governance of the 
government functions which are regulatory function, development coordination and budget 
allocation function. Each index consists of six principles of governance which are 
participation, fairness, accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. The score 
ranges from 0 to 10.  
- Regional socioeconomic Conditions 
Socioeconomic conditions reflect some aspects of quality of life. Therefore, human 
development and the level of poverty could be considered as suitable proxies for regions' 
socioeconomic conditions.  
 Human Development Index 
We retrieve data on the regional human development index (HDI) from the BPS. 
Referring to the UNDP, the BPS defines the human development index as a process of 
enlarging the choice of people. Therefore, there are three aspects in measuring the HDI which 
are life expectancy, education and living standards.    
 Poverty 
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We obtain data on the level of poverty of regions from the BPS.  The level of poverty 
is measured as the number of population below the poverty threshold (line) to total 
population.  
- Control Variables 
 Conflict Regions 
We include a dummy variable for regions that are unstable in terms of politic and 
security (conflict regions). The dark side of the institutional reforms is political instability in 
some regions which lead to a disintegration problem as they insist to be much more 
decentralized. Roe and Siegel (2011) also find that cross country difference in financial 
development is also influenced by the level of political stability.  
 Outside Java island 
Indonesia has a unique feature regarding its location that is geographically spread out. 
To control for this geographical aspect, we account for a dummy variable taking a value of 1 
for provinces situated outside the Java Island. Java is considered as the most developed island 
in Indonesia as it benefited much more from the centralization policy of the New Order 
regime. Java is also the island where the capital of Indonesia (Jakarta) is located. 
 New Province 
Another implication of the institutional reforms was splitting some provinces into new 
provinces. Before the reforms, the number of provinces was 27 provinces. 7 new provinces 
emerged early after the reforms and 1 province (East Timor) decided to become a new 
country. Therefore currently Indonesia consists of 33 provinces. To account for possible 
differences in financial development between new provinces and existing provinces, we 
include a dummy variable for new provinces.   
 Budget Deficit 
We include a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for regions with governments facing 
budget deficits following the study of Gallindo and Micco (2004). Two contradictory 
consequences may arise concerning the impact of deficits of local government budgets on 
financial deepening. As argued by Chen et al. (2011), budget deficits could increase incentive 
to rent-seeking which is a detrimental factor to investment and business growth. On the other 
side, budget deficits could also encourage the local government to promote investments and 
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infrastructure development through public-private partnerships which subsequently could 
increase the bank lending for project financing.  
We collect information regarding the budget of local governments from the Supreme 
Audit Institution (Indonesian: Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan/ BPK). Local governments have 
to report their financial reports to the BPK for the auditing purpose.   
 GDP per Capita 
We also control for natural log of GDP following the studies of Gallindo and Micco 
(2004) and Roe and Siegel (2011). Data on regional GDP as well as provincial population are 
obtained from the BPS. Because the data on population are based on ten-yearly census, we 
interpolate them to get yearly data.    
 Oil or Gas Producer 
The last control variable is a dummy variable to account for regions which are oil or 
gas producers. Data to identify whether a region is an oil or gas producer is obtained from the 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.   
 
4.2. Estimation Strategy 
We use OLS to run our specifications on the determinants of financial development 
following the studies of Galindo and Micco (2004) and Dehesa et al. (2007) in a cross-
country study. As the bureaucracy index and government index are highly correlated, we do 
not introduce these two variables concurrently. Similarly, because of their strong correlations, 
we do not introduce variables such as the human development index, the poverty variable and 
the dummy for conflict regions at the same time.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation of variables 
Descriptive statistics of variables is presented in table 1. We present the statistics of 
financial depth for each province in table 2. Table 3 exhibits the correlation matrix of 
variables. 
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----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
----------------------------- 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
----------------------------- 
 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
----------------------------- 
As presented in the descriptive statistics in table 2, the average ratio of credit released 
by commercial banks located in Jakarta to Jakarta’s GDP during the period we study is 
80.41% (the maximum), while 6.07% is the minimum average of such a ratio which is for the 
province of Sulawesi Tenggara. As shown in table 1, the standard deviation of this ratio is 
15.2%, while the standard deviation of the ratio of commercial bank loans given to micro, 
small and medium enterprises in a province over the province’s GDP is 10.4%. The data 
clearly show that the level of financial deepening is imbalanced across regions. If we turn to 
the ratio of the number of bank branches per million population of province, again we notice 
a large dispersion among regions. During the observation period, the average of this ratio for 
Jakarta is 54 bank branches per million of inhabitants, while in Sulawesi Tenggara, 4 bank 
offices per million people is the average.   
As expected, the correlation matrix shows that the proxies of local governance which 
are the bureaucracy index and the government index are positively correlated with all of our 
dependent variables. We also find that the human development index is positively correlated 
with the proxies of financial depth, while the level of poverty is negatively correlated with the 
financial depth’s measures.  
 
5.2. Empirical Results  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
----------------------------- 
Table 4 presents the results of OLS regression of our first proxy of financial depth 
which is the ratio of credit released by commercial banks located in a province to local GDP. 
Our results show that provinces with a higher level of bureaucracy index have a significantly 
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higher ratio of commercial bank credit to local GDP. Likewise, the government index is 
significantly and positively associated with our first measure of financial depth. Turning to 
the impact of socioeconomic conditions, as expected, we find that human development index 
is positively associated with the level of bank loans to province’s GDP. Similarly, the ratio of 
loans released by commercial banks located in a province to province’s GDP is significantly 
lower for the provinces with a higher level of poverty.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 here 
----------------------------- 
Table 5 reports the results of OLS regressions of the ratio of commercial bank loans 
given to micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in a province over province’s GDP. 
The coefficients of bureaucracy index and government index are all positive and significant. 
Similar results are found for the coefficients of the human development index. Poverty is 
negatively associated with the depth banks released loans to MSMEs.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 here 
----------------------------- 
Table 6 exhibits the results of OLS regressions of the ratio of number of bank 
branches per capita. Similarly to those obtained for the two first dependent variables, we find 
evidence that local governance matter to explain the level of financial deepening. Regions 
with good governance, represented by a high degree of bureaucracy index and government 
index, have a higher level of financial deepening. As expected, we also find that the 
coefficient of the human development index is positive and significant in all the regressions.  
 In general, our results provide evidence that unequal financial deepening in Indonesia 
is significantly influenced by how well the local governments manage their regions. There are 
several possible explanations. First, as argued by the law and finance literature (e.g. La Porta 
et al., 1997; Levine, 1998), the quality of local government is important to ensure that legal 
institutions are well-imposed especially with regard to the creditor/ lender rights to stimulate 
banks in channeling credit. Second, bureaucratic procedure in doing business indicates to 
which extent the local government is capable of facilitating a favorable business climate to 
attract business investments. This is consistent with some cross country studies which show 
the positive relationship between the degree of openness and financial development (e.g. 
Herger et al., 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Moreover, it is generally known that 
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governments with poor governance are keen on corruption and rent seeking behaviors, which 
are detrimental factors to business investment and public infrastructure development. 
Subsequently, commercial banks and other types of banks may be reluctant to establish their 
business in the poor governance regions which in turn impedes banking competition in the 
regions.   
Our results also show that in the socioeconomically less developed regions, the level 
of financial deepening is lower than that of more developed regions. Overall, this finding is 
consistent with our expectations. As explained earlier, the impact of socioeconomic 
conditions on the level of financial deepening could be viewed from lender (banks) and 
borrower sides. From the lender side, it is generally accepted that lenders are much more 
willing to channel loans when they know more about borrowers (Djankov et al., 2007). In the 
socioeconomically less developed regions, reflected by high degree of poverty and low 
human development, banks lack incentives to release credit as the information as well as the 
quality of borrowers are deficient. To grant loans, banks face expensive costs in terms of 
information and dealing costs. Furthermore, banks have to deal with borrowers with lower 
quality which subsequently increases their risk. Even though banks could charge a higher risk 
premium to cover the higher risk, Indonesian banks generally tend to behave prudently. On 
the other hand, in such regions deficit spending units also tend to be reluctant to use bank 
loans as they perceive that the process of getting loans from banks is more complicated than 
the process of obtaining, for example a loan from predatory lender or a pawnshop.  
Moreover, some banking regulations might have exacerbated the unequal banking 
development. First, the regulation on the income of bank borrowers have naturally created a 
barrier to financial deepening. Second, as revealed by Rosengard and Prasetyantoko (2011), 
the banking consolidation process which has been promoted by regulators has strengthened 
banking oligopoly maintaining a high intermediation cost.  
Regarding control variables, we find that the level of financial deepening is lower in 
the conflict (politically and securitically unstable) regions than in other regions. The results 
confirm the finding of Roe and Siegel (2011) in a cross country research showing that 
political instability impedes financial development. Second, we find that credit released by 
commercial banks is lower in the provinces located outside Java Island even though the ratio 
of bank offices per capita is higher in such regions. Our results also show that there is a 
significant difference in financial development between existing provinces and new 
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provinces. Interestingly, the latter have a significantly higher level of financial depth. We find 
that the ratio of number of bank branches per capita is positively associated with GDP per 
capita. In contrast, the ratio of commercial bank loans given to micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) in a province to its GDP is lower in the regions with a higher ratio of 
GDP per capita. No difference in financial deepening is found between deficit and surplus 
budget provinces. Likewise, we find only little evidence of differences in financial depth 
between regions which produce oil or gas and their non-producer counterparts.   
 
5.3. Robustness Checks  
We perform several robustness checks. First, we use secondary school enrolment 
following the study of Hasan et al. (2009) as a proxy of socioeconomic conditions to replace 
the human development index. Contextually, the Indonesian government has also 
implemented a policy that the minimum education should be secondary (junior high) school
9
.  
The results show that provinces with a higher level of secondary school enrollment 
significantly have a higher level of financial depth. For all the remaining variables the results 
are also consistent.  
Second, we run regressions by excluding the natural log of GDP per capita as it has a 
strong correlation with the proxies of socioeconomic conditions (human development index 
and poverty). With regard to our variables of interest (local governance and socioeconomic 
variables), our results remain unchanged.  
Third, we change the proxies of financial depth to the ratio of bank loans to 
province’s population and the ratio of bank loans to MSMEs over province’s population. 
Again, the results show that local governance and socioeconomic conditions matter to explain 
cross region differences in financial deepening. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We investigate the determinants of unequal financial deepening across regions in 
Indonesia by considering local governance and socioeconomic conditions as the main factors. 
We use data of 33 provinces over the 2004-2010 period (after the decentralization policy).    
                                                            
9 This policy is called nine-year compulsory education (Indonesian: wajib belajar sembilan tahun). 
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We find that local governance quality is significantly and positively associated with 
the importance of bank lending - and to MSMEs specifically - with regards to local GDP. 
Local governance quality is also positively linked with the number of bank offices per capita. 
Our results also show that in the socioeconomically less developed regions, as reflected by 
low human development and high degree of poverty, the level of financial deepening is lower 
than that of more developed regions. In general, even though decentralization has been 
implemented globally in Indonesia, regional disparity in the form of financial deepening still 
exists.   
Our findings have some noteworthy policy implications. First, improving local 
governance, particularly for regions having poor governance, should be encouraged to 
facilitate a favorable business environment. An encouraging business climate could provide 
incentives for banks to expand their business more specifically in granting loans. Second, 
regulators have to reconsider regulations that have constrained bank lending especially the 
regulation on the income of bank borrowers and its strong limitations. This regulation might 
have improved the soundness of banks but it might also have gone too far by excluding a 
large number of borrowers from the formal system encouraging "predatory lending" practices 
in the financially less developed regions.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of variables. CRE_GDP is the ratio of credit released by commercial banks located 
in a province to province’s GDP. SME_GDP is the ratio of commercial bank loans given to micro, small and medium 
enterprises in a province over province’s GDP. OFF_POP is the ratio of number of bank branches per million population of 
province. BUREAU is the bureaucracy index, while GOVERN stands for the government index. HDI represents human 
development index. POVERTY is the level of poverty. LNGDPPERCAP is the natural log of province GDP per capita.  
  CRE_GDP SME_GDP OFF_POP BUREAU GOVERN HDI POVERTY LNGDPPERCAP 
 Mean 0.217 0.179 15.330 5.609 4.945 70.292 16.695 16.295 
 Median 0.183 0.165 12.236 5.740 4.920 70.320 14.625 16.234 
 Maximum 0.997 0.667 62.579 7.340 6.800 77.600 41.570 18.448 
 Minimum 0.028 0.041 3.535 3.880 3.530 60.600 3.180 14.901 
 Std. Dev. 0.152 0.104 10.561 0.838 0.851 3.294 8.625 0.719 
 Skewness 2.637 1.837 2.180 -0.304 0.275 -0.349 0.826 0.762 
 Observnation 222 213 231 231 231 231 226 231 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of financial depth each province  
No Province 
Average credit 
to province's 
GDP 
Average credit to 
MSMEs over 
province's GDP 
Average bank 
branches to million 
province's 
population 
1 Jawa Barat 0.151585 0.167045 7.549934 
2 Banten 0.211209 0.216435 6.09837 
3 DKI Jakarta 0.804159 0.211325 54.69153 
4 D.I Yogyakarta 0.233692 0.195186 13.86315 
5 Jawa Tengah 0.191211 0.146325 7.713605 
6 Jawa Timur 0.174687 0.113382 9.607461 
7 Bengkulu 0.233627 0.237419 9.823258 
8 Jambi 0.181039 0.166913 14.49752 
9 
Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam 
0.112975 0.105513 12.7248 
10 Sumatera Utara 0.277216 0.144166 11.32808 
11 Sumatera Barat 0.190449 0.152634 15.40538 
12 Riau 0.098391 0.071691 10.02068 
13 Sumatera Selatan 0.089371 0.064844 5.442373 
14 Kepulauan Riau 0.322449 0.252285 43.30654 
15 Bangka Belitung 0.113382 0.08813 18.38444 
16 Lampung 0.17065 0.133475 5.89149 
17 Kalimantan Selatan 0.227636 0.169252 17.09068 
18 Kalimantan Barat 0.176742 0.148041 11.49368 
19 Kalimantan Timur 0.07343 0.049332 28.01721 
20 Kalimantan Tengah 0.130586 0.097066 12.95606 
21 Sulawesi Tengah 0.201794 0.18609 10.67918 
22 Sulawesi Selatan 0.30837 0.243932 11.43564 
23 Sulawesi Utara 0.242101 0.275376 21.77532 
24 Sulawesi Barat 0.277152 0.22098 10.31237 
25 Gorontalo 0.495298 0.557642 23.33381 
26 Sulawesi Tenggara 0.060666 0.05699 4.1979 
27 Nusa Tenggara Barat 0.148065 0.151064 7.394472 
28 Bali 0.304769 0.270322 20.94691 
29 Nusa Tenggara Timur 0.2221 0.217585 8.981006 
30 Maluku 0.293108 0.276596 19.5568 
31 Papua 0.076143 0.067278 13.15871 
32 Maluku Utara 0.276154 0.262264 14.94563 
33 Irian Jaya Barat 0.129386 0.100658 25.84427 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of variables. CRE_GDP is the ratio of credit released by commercial banks located 
in a province to province’s GDP. SME_GDP is the ratio of commercial bank loans given to micro, small and medium 
enterprises in a province over province’s GDP. OFF_POP is the ratio of number of bank branches per million population of 
province. BUREAU is the bureaucracy index, while GOVERN stands for the government index. HDI represents human 
development index. POVERTY is the level of poverty. LNGDPPERCAP is the natural log of province GDP per capita.   
  CRE_GDP SME_GDP OFF_POP BUREAU GOVERN HDI POVERTY LNGDPPERCAP 
CRE_GDP 1 
       SME_GDP 0.637 1 
      OFF_POP 0.659 0.278 1 
     BUREAU 0.409 0.280 0.344 1 
    GOVERN 0.311 0.063 0.318 0.696 1 
   HDI 0.310 0.018 0.459 0.307 0.233 1 
  POVERTY -0.260 -0.005 -0.304 -0.335 -0.270 -0.630 1 
 LNGDPPERCAP 0.125 -0.351 0.569 0.201 0.299 0.587 -0.393 1 
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Table 4: OLS Regressions of Bank Loan to Region’s GDP 
The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  Bank Loan/ GDP 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bureaucracy Index 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 
   
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
   Government Index 
   
0.063*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 
    
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Human Development 
Index 0.012*** 
  
0.015*** 
  
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  Poverty 
 
-0.002** 
  
-0.002*** 
 
  
(0.0009) 
  
(0.0008) 
 Conflict 
  
-0.074*** 
  
-0.111*** 
   
(0.017) 
  
(0.016) 
Outside Java -0.052* -0.059** -0.055* -0.041 -0.055* -0.046 
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) 
New Province 0.044* 0.035 0.041* 0.078*** 0.065*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) 
Budget Deficit 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.016 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Natural Log GDP Per 
Capita -0.027 -0.014 0.002 -0.028 -0.019 0.004 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) 
Oil or Gas Producer -0.024 -0.010 -0.013 -0.047** -0.028** -0.032* 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017) 
Constant  -0.403 -0.230 -0.062 -0.499 0.363 -0.058 
  (0.451) (0.417) (0.440) (0.464) (0.399) (0.446) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Number of Province 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Number of Observations 221 221 221 221 221 221 
Period 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 
R-Squared  0.278 0.253 0.259 0.295 0.248 0.267 
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Table 5: OLS Regressions of Bank Loan to MSMEs over Region’s GDP 
The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  Bank Loan to MSMEs/ GDP 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bureaucracy Index 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 
   
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
   Government Index 
   
0.042*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
    
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
Human Development 
Index 0.009*** 
  
0.011*** 
  
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  Poverty 
 
-0.001 
  
-0.001* 
 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.0007) 
 Conflict 
  
-0.047*** 
  
-0.073*** 
   
(0.010) 
  
(0.010) 
Outside Java 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.018 0.004 0.011 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
New Province 0.082*** 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) 
Budget Deficit -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Natural Log GDP Per 
Capita -0.084*** -0.071*** -0.063*** -0.090*** -0.073*** -0.060*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Oil or Gas Producer -0.033*** -0.022** -0.024** -0.048** -0.035*** -0.037*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant  0.743*** 1.140*** 1.011*** 0.664*** 1.227*** 1.003*** 
  (0.149) (0.143) (0.152) (0.150) (0.142) (0.146) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Number of Province 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Number of Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212 
Period 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 
R-Squared  0.524 0.484 0.495 0.529 0.460 0.487 
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Table 6: OLS Regressions of Bank Branches to Population (Million) 
The values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  Bank Offices/ Population (million) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bureaucracy Index 2.251*** 2.898*** 2.716*** 
   
 
(0.689) (0.725) (0.697) 
   Government Index 
   
3.043*** 3.142*** 3.066*** 
    
(0.602) (0.679) (0.647) 
Human Development 
Index 0.628*** 
  
0.787*** 
  
 
(0.127) 
  
(0.142) 
  Poverty 
 
0.006 
  
-0.026 
 
  
(0.054) 
  
(0.056) 
 Conflict 
  
-0.866 
  
-2.702** 
   
(1.260) 
  
(1.248) 
Outside Java 2.556 1.948 2.116 3.360** 2.352 2.736 
 
(1.664) (1.670) (1.695) (1.601) (1.656) (1.662) 
New Province 7.417*** 6.467*** 6.938*** 9.128*** 8.136*** 8.689*** 
 
(1.373) (1.471) (1.394) (1.254) (1.403) (1.326) 
Budget Deficit 0.437 0.494 0.436 0.261 0.442 0.307 
 
(1.394) (1.420) (1.416) (1.360) (1.400) (1.396) 
Natural Log GDP Per 
Capita 8.151*** 9.050*** 9.325*** 7.606*** 8.813*** 9.396*** 
 
(1.235) (1.219) (1.248) (1.197) (1.248) (1.348) 
Oil or Gas Producer -1.669 -1.067 -0.946 -2.621** -1.958* -1.850 
 
(1.028) (1.141) (1.120) (1.084) (1.154) (1.147) 
Constant  -179.08*** -152.25*** -155.95*** -184.20*** -147.28*** -157.21*** 
  (22.313) (22.010) (22.340) (23.482) (21.0253) (22.612) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Number of Province 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Number of Observations 230 225 230 230 225 230 
Period 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 
R-Squared  0.504 0.469 0.484 0.523  0.475 0.494 
 
